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WHO IS LOOKING OUT FOR THE PUBLIC
INTEREST? THOUGHTS ABOUT THE UCC
REVISION PROCESS IN THE LIGHT
(AND SHADOWS) OF PROFESSOR
RUBIN'S OBSERVATIONS
DonaldJ. Rapson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

When I agreed to write an article for this Symposium, I decided
to say something about the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) revision process. At the present time, I am involved with that process as
an American Law Institute (ALI) member of the Article 9 Drafting
Committee. Although not a member of the Article 5 and Article 8
Drafting Committees, I have also been pressing them concerning certain issues.
I was also an ALI member of the Article 6 Drafting Committee
which ultimately adopted my recommendation favoring repeal,1 and I
played a role in the 1990 Amendments to Article 2A.2 In addition, I
was on the drafting committees as an ALI representative for the revisions of Articles 3 and 43 and the new Article 4A. Before that I was
on the ill-fated "3-4-8 Committee" of the Permanent Editorial Board
for the UCC (PEB) which drafted the New Payments Code.
Although I can and will discuss those experiences, I am primarily interested in offering something constructive about the revision process
in the context of the Symposium's question "Is the UCC Dead, or
Alive and Well?" I am honored to have been involved in that process
and generally proud of the accomplishments. At the same time, how* Senior Vice President and Assistant General Counsel of The CIT Group, Inc.; Adjunct Professor of Law, New York University Law School; Lecturer-in-Law, Columbia Law
School; Member, Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code; Member,
Article 9 Drafting Committee; Adviser, Restatement of the Law Third Suretyship.
1. See Donald J. Rapson, U.C.C. Article 6: Should It Be Revised or "Deep-Sixed"?, 38
Bus. LAW. 1753 (1983) (reprintedin 88 CoM. LJ. 600 (1983)).
2. See Donald J. Rapson, Deficiencies and Ambiguities in Lessors' Remedies Under
Article 2A: Using Official Comments to Cure Problems in the Statute, 39

ALA.

L. REv. 875

(1988).
3. See Donald J. Rapson, Loss Allocation in Forgery and Fraud Cases: Significant
Changes Under Revised Articles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. Rlv. 435 (1991).
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ever, I am somewhat uneasy about a process that in its genuine desire
to be "open," participatory, and accessible to all interests, may inadvertently be inhibiting the attainment of complete objectivity and fairness in the emerging drafts.
In recounting Homer Kripke's contribution to the development
of Article 9, Professor Grant Gilmore stated that Professor Kripke
was preeminent in his contribution-not only in his willingness to share his extensive knowledge but even more in the
absolute integrity with which he was able to distinguish between what the private interest of the professional lenders
seemed to require and what the public interest demanded.4
I have tried to follow that credo in the revision process. The title of
this article reflects my concern, however, as to whether the structure
of the UCC revision process gives sufficient attention to and concern
for the demands of the public interest.
In the earlier Symposium of the academics on this topic, Professor Edward L. Rubin wrote thoughtfully and provocatively about that
process.5 His article serves as a useful starting point for an examination and analysis of the process, with a view to making constructive
suggestions for its improvement. Part II of this article analyzes Professor Rubin's criticisms of the revision process for UCC Articles 3
(Negotiable Instruments) and 4 (Bank Deposits and Collections).
Part III reflects my own views with respect to the overall UCC revision process in terms of its efficacy in serving the public interest. Part
IV discusses the need for improving that process, focusing upon the
pending revision of Article 5 (Letters of Credit) and the ongoing revision of Article 9 (Secured Transactions).
II. PROFESSOR RuBIN's

CRITICISMS

In his article, Professor Rubin describes his unhappy experience
as chairperson of the subcommittee on Articles 3 and 4 of the Ad Hoc
Committee on Payment Systems of the Section on Business Law of
the American Bar Association (ABA). His conclusions about the revision process were bitter and overwrought:
In the process of drafting and enacting the revisions of
Articles 3 and 4, however, one of the major forces was not
4. Grant Gilmore, Dedication to Professor Homer Kripke, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 9, 12
(1981) (emphasis added).
5. Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer,Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on
the Process of Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 743 (1993).
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present. Banks were well represented; corporate users were
represented intermittently; but consumers were virtually unrepresented. The result was that the banking industry and its
attorneys dominated the entire process, save for a few brief
interludes. This domination was amplified by the fact that
the representatives involved were lawyers, with their characteristic tendency to bond with their client group.
The banking industry is entitled to be represented, of
course, and it can be expected to lobby assiduously for its
positions. But the American Law Institute and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
should not lend their names to the bankers' enterprise.
When they do, as occurred with the Article 3 and 4 revisions,
they give the banking industry the ability to clothe itself with
public policy, and to overwhelm most state legislatures with a
false aura of public-oriented impartiality. This was a disgrace. If the ALI and NCCUSL cannot do better under their
present structure, both organizations should be extensively
reformed or entirely abolished.6
Having been a member of the Articles 3 and 4 Drafting Committees and also a member and regular attendee at Professor Rubin's
ABA subcommittee meetings, I share some of his same concerns
about the process, but disagree with and am puzzled by some of his
observations. In particular, I reject his characterization of the process
for the Articles 3 and 4 revisions as a "disgrace." Professor Rubin has
gone astray in castigating the ALI and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) because of his disappointment with the subcommittee of the ABA. The drafting
committee is, of course, an entirely different committee appointed by
ALI and NCCUSL. I do not recall whether Professor Rubin ever attended meetings of the drafting committee.
I was completely surprised by Professor Rubin's vote to disapprove the Articles 3 and 4 revisions and his subsequent resignation as
chair of the ABA subcommittee. Indeed, although I was aware of his
position on certain consumer issues, I was not aware of the depth of
his general opposition to the Articles 3 and 4 revisions. I have always
been and remain on good terms with Professor Rubin, but have no
recollection of his having ever indicated to me his intention to vote as
he did. Nor do I have any recollection of his having written any letter
6. Id. at 787-88.
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or memorandum to the drafting committee or to any of its membersincluding myself-setting forth his opposition to the revisions or attempting to persuade or dissuade the drafting committee concerning
particular substantive provisions. I have spoken with Roland Brandel
and William Davenport who sequentially chaired the ABA Ad Hoc
Committee on Payment Systems (of which Professor Rubin's subcommittee was a part) and who also attended the drafting committee
meetings. They were equally surprised by Professor Rubin's vote and
have the same recollection about the absence of efforts on his part to
convince the drafting committee on substantive matters.
It is not my primary purpose to respond in depth to Professor
Rubin's criticism of Articles 3 and 4 although some comments are in
order. He has rendered an important service by making us think
about the process even though one may disagree with his conclusion.
Professor Rubin's recitation of his experiences as chairperson of the
ABA subcommittee and eventual resignation suggests, in and of itself,
a different but larger problem. Have the academic community and
practicing bar generally failed to elevate themselves above special interests and personal points of view in drafting new or revised UCC
provisions? Considering that Professor Rubin, as chairperson of an
important ABA subcommittee, had a unique opportunity to be part of
the process and to influence the result, and yet became so critical of
that process, it may be useful to ask what went wrong and why? Did
the process fail to consider Professor Rubin's positions-or did he fail
to adequately assert those positions? Would the end result have been
any different?
Professor Rubin's letter of resignation took a more conciliatory
tone than his article in explaining his position:
I should add that I do not regard my resignation as a
criticism of either the ABA Subcommittee or of the Drafting
Committee for the Article 3-4 revisions. I think the Drafting
Committee and its Reporters did a very creditable job of fulfilling the assignment given to them by the UCC's sponsors,
and that the members of the Subcommittee were thoughtful
and responsible in their deliberations.
I adopted my position on the proposed revisions because I do not think that the mission given to the Drafting
Committee represents good public policy, from the perspective of either social equity or economic efficiency. When I
became Chair, I did not believe that the ABA Subcommittee
had any prior commitment to approve the sponsor's mission;
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I hoped it would disapprove any revisions, however, technically adept, that were based on that mission, or that it could
persuade the UCC sponsors to change the mission to reflect
a more desirable policy. I am sure, however, that each Subcommittee member acted on the basis of his or her own view
of what is best for the payment system, and for-the nation as
a whole. I am resigning only because my substantive position on the issue differs from that of most subcommittee
members.7
By "mission given to the Drafting Committee," I believe that Professor Rubin is referring to his perception of an understanding between
NCCUSL and the banking industry:
A new revision process would be initiated to modernize Articles 3 and 4 in light of changes in technology that had occurred since the original UCC was promulgated in 1951. The
revision would not attempt to unify payment law; it would
simply update the existing Articles 3 and 4, and add one new
article-designated 4A-to govern wholesale wire transfers.
It was further agreed that the new revision would not alter
the balance between banks and consumers that existed in the
original Articles 3 and 4, nor would it add any new provisions dealing with consumer protection.8
Professor Rubin's disagreement with the performance of that "mission" was reflected in another article written after his resignation:
The revisions of Articles 3 and 4 are superbly drafted,
and represent high levels of technical achievement. Underneath their polished surface, however, they are deeply
flawed. They perpetuate the one-sided, pro-bank perspective of the original, to the exclusion of any cognizable social
policy. The revisions fail to achieve a policy of economic efficiency. While they may minimize bank costs, they generate
excessive social costs by imposing unnecessary losses on consumers and providing too few protections. Moreover, the revisions are inequitable; they fail to consider the consumer's
powerless position and give banks too much leeway to be
arbitrary, careless, or positively oppressive. This is hardly

7. Letter from Edward L. Rubin to William B. Davenport (Nov. 26, 1990) (on file
with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
8. Rubin, supra note 5, at 746.
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surprising, since the drafting process of the revisions, like
that of the original, was dominated by banking interests.9
This should be contrasted with his perception of the "real debate"
written three years earlier:
One may question the language of particular changes
that the revisers have suggested or the techniques they utilize
to achieve particular goals. But questions of this nature will
always arise in connection with complex, technical statutes
like articles 3 and 4. Those who have reviewed the revision
have generally been impressed with the technical quality of
the drafting and the imaginative nature of the solutions to
some long-standing interpretive problems. The real debate
concerning the revision is likely to focus on the norms or policies that motivated the proposed changes. The revision reflects a strong preference for operational reliability, coupled
with a general belief that those responsible for the operation
of the system will share this preference and implement it
more reliably than outside experts. Evaluation of the proposed revision, if it is to be as serious and as comprehensive
as the importance of the statute justifies, must focus on this
choice of policy and on the alternatives that the contemporary debate has proposed.10
Professor Rubin's failure to be wholly objective and fair must be
noted. In characterizing the revisions to Articles 3 and 4 as a "bankers' enterprise," he failed to mention important substantive changes
that generally benefit users and not just consumer users. A prime example is the expansion of "good-faith" from the purely subjective test
of "honesty in fact" to also include "reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing."11 Most assuredly that change was not generated by
bankers. 12 It was not suggested by Professor Rubin. Nor was it suggested by consumer advocates. Rather, it was suggested by the membership of the drafting committee and supported by the reporters.
Most consumer advocates, and I suspect Professor Rubin as well, enthusiastically support that change.
9. Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the ProposedRevision ofArticles 3 and 4,42
ALA. L. REv. 551, 592 (1991).
10. Edward L. Rubin, Policiesand Issues in the ProposedRevision of Articles 3 and 4 of
the UCC, 43 Bus. LAw. 621, 663-64 (1988).
11. U.C.C. §§ 3-103(4), 4-104(c) (1990).
12. The expanded definition was set forth in UCC § 4A-105(a)(6) without objection.
It was then written into Articles 3 and 4 in the interests of consistency.
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Another important part of the revisions is the recognition that a
bank has a duty to exercise ordinary care in the manner in which it
allows accounts to be opened and in connection with activities involving that account."3 For example, a bank may be liable for allowing a
defrauder to open an account in the name of or one similar to a payee,
and then accepting checks for deposit to that account over a period of
time under irregular circumstances. This was not mentioned by Professor Rubin.
The codification of the common-law rule governing "full pay-4
ment" checks as a means of accomplishing an accord and satisfaction
is another example of an important revision which was certainly not
bank-motivated. The use of that device as an "easy, inexpensive, and
convenient method for effecting settlements in a wide range of types
of disagreement"'" is clearly for the benefit of users generally. In additiofi, the revision provides a mechanism for unwinding an inadvertent accord and satisfaction. 6 This can be particularly helpful in a
consumer context, for example, hasty deposits by accident victims of
settlement checks from insurance companies which contain releases of
claims. Again, there is no mention of this change by Professor Rubin.
I could go further but it is unnecessary. By using words such as
"disgrace" and "bankers' enterprise," Professor Rubin not only does a
disservice to those of us on the drafting committee who worked hard
to accomplish these kinds of changes, but more importantly, detracts
from his essentially valid point that we should be examining the revision process.

Ill. THE

EFFICACY OF THE UNIFoRM LAWS PROCESS IN SERVING

THE PUBLIC INTEREST

Despite these reservations about the objectivity and fairness of
Professor Rubin's comments about the revision of Articles 3 and 4, I
fully agree that there should be consumer representation in the drafting process. Indeed, that need has been recognized and implemented
by ALI and NCCUSL. There are a number of consumer representatives serving as observers to the Article 9 Drafting Committee, includ13. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-405 cmt.4.
14. Id. § 3-311.
15. Albert J. Rosenthal, Discord and Dissatisfaction: Section 1-207 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 48, 57 (1978).
16. U.C.C. § 3-311(c)(2) (1990).
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ing a number of the people mentioned by Professor Rubin. 17
Similarly, the disparate interests and bargaining positions of small
businesses as distinguished from "corporate America" should also be
recognized. Again, there are several persons representing the perspective of the lower-middle and middle markets acting as advisers to
the Article 9 Drafting Committee.
I also agree with Professor Rubin's view that the banking industry should not be allowed to dominate the revision process. 18 I have
some concerns about the pressures from bank interest groups placed
upon the Article 5 Drafting Committee and will say more about this
below. No group-including consumers-should dominate the process. Professor Rubin is also correct when he attributes the problem
to the tendency of lawyers, involved in the drafting process, to think
according to "traditional patterns of common-law adjudication"19 and
'20
their "identifying with the client or negotiating with the opposition.
These lawyers include law professors who also act as consultants. It is,
however, the last observation in his article which raises the really critical issue about the revision process:
Opinions will vary about whether these adversarial patterns are detrimental to good social decision making. One
thing is clear, however: If the adversary process is employed,
those who employ it must be scrupulous about ensuring that
all relevant interests are represented. In the absence of a
representative, no one will speak for that interest because all
the other participants are committed to, and indeed conditioned by, their own perspective. To derive a proper rule or
policy from the clash of opposing forces seems to be a questionable strategy, but it does not even offer the possibility of
good results if the opposing forces are not present.2 '
Professor Rubin did not explore the issue of whether the public interest is best served by an adversarial process in drafting statutory
change. More recently, however, Professor Kathleen Patchel provided a detailed and thoughtful analysis of "whether the uniform laws
process is an adequate mechanism for drafting" commercial law stat17. For example, Gail Hillebrand of Consumers Union in San Francisco, David McMahon of West Virginia Legal Services, Inc., and Yvonne Rosmarin of the National Consumer
Law Center in Boston.
18. See Rubin, supra note 5, at 787-88.
19. Id. at 773.
20. Id. at 768.
21. Id. at 787.
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utes in modem times. In the remainder of this article, I want to
examine the issue posed by Professor Rubin in the context of Professor Patchel's analysis and the question in the title of this article-Who
Is Looking Out for the Public Interest?
A.

Defining the "PublicInterest"

I start with the basic premise that the public interest is best
served by having clear, concise, and efficient statutory rules so that the
parties to a transaction can anticipate the issues and answers that may
arise and guide their actions acordingly. To be efficient the rule must
also be fair because rules that give one party an undue advantage over
the other inevitably lead to disputes and are counterproductive. A
party to a commercial transaction expects to be dealt with fairly by the
other party. That objective is more likely to be achieved if both parties are required to deal fairly.
In addition, the concepts or rationale underlying the rule should
be understood so that aberrant, capricious, or arbitrary behavior
within the letter, but not the spirit of the rule, will be deterred. The
official comments can often promote such an objective. For me, the
concept of "good faith," defined to include "reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing," admirably accomplishes the latter goal.
Thus, the statutory rule should fulfill two functions: first, as a guideline for the conduct of behavior and second, as an explication of the

criteria for measuring the propriety of the behavior.'
22. Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism,and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 Mimn. L. REv. 83, 86 (1993).
Regrettably, Professor Patchel somewhat diminishes the credibility of her thoughtful article with statements such as "revised Articles 3 and 4 are even more pro-bank than were
their predecessors." Id. at 110. In doing so, she demonstrates the same lack of objectivity
and fairness as Professor Rubin in failing to consider the provisions that benefit users. See
supra text accompanying note 11.
23. Steven L. Schwarcz, Revising Article Nine: A Bickelian Approach to Statutory
and Drafting Obsolescence (Aug. 10, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) proposes that statutory changes should be judged in
light of the principles-meaning the fundamental consensus goals-underlying the statute.
He identifies clarity, flexibility, fairness, simplicity of implementation, consistency, and
completeness as the principles underlying Article 9's construction as a statute, and uses
them to examine changes currently being proposed to Article 9.
Schwarcz observes that there are actually several.aspects to fairness., Fairness helps to
preserve expectations by ensuring that parties are governed by neutral rules. Fairness also
can mean, in more limited circumstances, that the law should protect weaker parties-such
as those with less bargaining power-and that opportunistic advantage-taking should be
prevented in circumstances that could not have been contemplated in advance. Id. at 2024.
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In the earlier Symposium, Professor Peter Alces questioned my
preference for the drafting approach of Article 9 over that of Article
2.2 I wrote to him that Article 9 generally "endeavors to prevent the
disputes by anticipating the issues and furnishing answers," and in
contrast, Part 5 (Default) of Article 9 "uses the Article 2 technique of
setting forth a 'commercial unreasonableness' standard that has generated litigation." 5 Professor Alces responded as follows:
Even if it were accurate that Article 2 generates more
litigation than most of Article 9, one could argue that the
measure of a commercial statute is not the volume of litigation it engenders or discourages, but the quality of the results
that courts can reach when they correctly apply the statute's
provisions. That is, wouldn't we prefer commercial law that
accommodates our getting the right answer when we do litigate over law that discourages the very litigation that might
guide us toward that answer? Certainly we could draft a
statute that precluded litigation and denied transactors access to the courts, but that would not be desirable, even if
efficacious. The answer lies in balance, a balance between
rules that provide predictable results and those that guide us
toward the best results. It would be inappropriate to conclude that commercial law that emphasizes "the sense of the
situation"-essentially factual determinations-is deficient
because it is less predictable before the fact.26
I agree with that statement. It is wholly consistent with my premise.
Regrettably, Professor Alces seems to have interpreted my comments
to mean that I would sacrifice the best results for predictable results.
Not so. The trouble with the Article 9, Part 5's "commercial reasonableness" standard is that it merely states a concept. Standing alone in
its uncertainty, that concept has invited too much litigation and fails
entirely to fulfill the first function of providing a guideline for the conduct of behavior.2 7 Consequently, "commercial reasonableness" also
fails to serve the second function, because without a guideline as to
what that behavior should be, there can be no meaningful criteria for
24. Peter A. Alces, Roll Over, Llewellyn?, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 543, 545-46 (1993).
25. Id. at 545 (quoting letter from Donald J. Rapson to Peter A. Alces (Mar. 31, 1986)
(on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review)).
26. Id. at 546.
27. I have elsewhere criticized the "commercial reasonableness" standard, particularly
in connection with deficiency actions. See Donald J. Rapson, Repurchase (of Collateral?)
Agreements and the Larger Issue of Deficiency Actions: What Does Section 9-504(5)
Mean?, 29 IDAHO L. Rnv. 649, 680-92 (1992-1993).
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determining the propriety of that behavior. The result is that "commercial reasonableness" does not "guide us to the best results." I
hope that Professor Alces will apply his "balance between rules that
provide predictable results and those that guide us toward the best
results" in his evaluations of revised Articles 5 and 8 that are now
emerging and to all future revisions of the UCC.
The crucial question then is whether the process presently being
followed by the UCC drafting committees promotes or inhibits the
development of the kind of statutory rules that will best serve the public interest.
B. NCCUSL's Perspective
At the outset, it is important to understand and appreciate the
perspective of NCCUSL with respect to the function of the drafting
committees. NCCUSL genuinely believes that the existing process
best serves the public interest. In the earlier Symposium, Professor
Fred Miller, the NCCUSL Executive Director, spoke of "the national
consensus reached through the NCCUSL and the ALI process" 2 and
described that process:
To answer the latter two queries first, the slogan of the
NCCUSL suggests one response: "diversity of thought, uniformity of law." States must realize that each uniform law is
not drafted in isolation, but is shaped by input from various
sources. Participating sources include NCCUSL commissioners and ALI members from each state, participants from
state bars or law revision commissions, observers and advisors from groups interested in the legislation, and the American Bar Association. These sources share experiences with
the legal subject under the diverse state laws. In short, experimentation has largely occurred before a uniform law is
formulated, and the best results from that experimentation
go into the uniform product.2 9
Professor Miller's description of the process is essentially correct.
Indeed, it is fair to say that in the effort to build a consensus, the
drafting committees have come increasingly to look and sound like
"mini-legislatures" or "mini-legislative committees." Since 1986 the
committees have functioned under NCCUSL's normal uniform laws
28. Fred H. Miller, Is Karl's Kode Kaput?, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 703, 712 (1993).
29. Id. at 709.
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procedures.3 0 Their membership is comprised of appointees who are
commissioners on Uniform State Laws, with the exception of some
appointees from ALl. For example, the Article 9 Drafting Committee
has nine commissioners and three ALI members. In addition, in a
genuine and sincere effort to have representation from as many interests as possible, the drafters invite numerous advisers and observers to
attend and participate in the meetings. At the most recent Article 9
meetings, approximately seventy-five to one hundred people attended. The meetings are open and everyone is free to speak out on
the issues-indeed, there is much free-ranging discussion. Since most
of those attending represent "interest groups" and understandably believe that they have a responsibility to air the views of their constituencies, such discussion is hardly surprising. Professor Rubin's wish
has been fulfilled-consumer representatives play as active a role in
the process as do the various creditor groups.
The drafting committees meet for two-and-a-half days approximately three times a year over a three-year period. Between meetings
drafts are submitted by the reporters and there is some exchange of
correspondence and memoranda among the participants. At the end
of the process, a final draft with proposed comments prepared by the
reporters is approved by the drafting committee and then submitted
to NCCUSL and ALI for their approval. Thereafter, it is the responsibility of NCCUSL to arrange for the approved version to be introduced into the various state legislatures and to urge enactment in that
form.

Clearly, extensive time, effort, and expense, most of which is
borne by NCCUSL, goes into this process. NCCUSL should be
praised, not castigated-but for its efforts, the recent and on-going
revisions to the UCC would probably not have happened. NCCUSL's
criterion for measuring the success of this effort is the extent and rapidity of legislative enactment uniformly throughout the states.3 1
Thus, NCCUSL's mind-set is that the final draft emerging from the
drafting committee is the product of a consensus arrived at through
30. Agreement Describing the Relationship of the American Law Institute, The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the Permanent Editorial
Board with Respect to the Uniform Commercial Code, reprinted in 64 A.L.I. PROc. 769,
772-75 (1987). Prior to that time, revisions to the UCC were accomplished under ALI
procedures used for revisions to the Restatements of the Law. NCCUSL takes the position
that the ALI procedures are less open than those of NCCUSL. See Fred H. Miller, U.C.C.
Articles 3, 4 and 4A: A Study in Process and Scope, 42 ALA. L. REv. 405, 410 & n.10
(1991). On the other hand, the ALI procedures may be more deliberative.
31. Patchel, supra note 22, at 92.
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open debate and discussion of the issues by and among the interested
parties, and should not be disturbed thereafter. NCCUSL's position is
that those who did not participate in that process would better serve
the public interest if they "contribute their energy to improving and
promoting it [the final draft], rather than to questioning reasonable
results arrived at through a participatory and open process. '32 As a
consequence, this procedure puts considerable pressure on critics of a
final draft to refrain from attempting to change it. instead the critics
are asked to acquiesce in and support the enactment of that draft in
the interest of uniformity and to wait a few years after enactment
before urging amendments. •
That concept, however, is acceptable only if the substantive content of the final draft satisfactorily takes into account the public interest. This brings us back to the question not discussed by Professor
Rubin 33 and the primary focus of this article-Who Is Looking Out
for the Public Interest? in the uniform laws process?
C. The Interest Groups
The "public interest," of course, means different things to different people. As previously discussed, statutory rules must be clear,
concise, and efficient. In order to be "efficient," the rule must also be
"fair" and encourage "fair dealing. '34 Not everyone agrees with the
latter point. Indeed, there is some reluctance to accept this view in
the drafting committees.
The attitude of many institutional or creditor groups that act as
observers in the drafting committees-banks, secured creditors, and
securities intermediaries-is that efficiency should be measured in
terms of lower transaction costs. Those lowered costs will inure to the
benefit 35 of customers, borrowers, and investors. In the institutional
and creditor groups' view, interjecting considerations of "fairness"
and "fair dealing" can interfere with the attainment of efficiency because those principles add uncertainty to transactions, leading to the
involvement of courts and judicial decisions that then exacerbate this
uncertainty. These views are certainly not limited to the interest
36
groups. They are also manifested by many respected academics,
32. Miller, supra note 28, at 714.
33. See supra text accompanying notes 17-22.
34. For additional discussions of "fair dealing" see supra text accompanying note 23,
and infra text accompanying notes 69-75.
35. A cynic might say "trickle down."
36. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 23 (discussing fairness).
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some of whom serve as reporters or as members or advisers to the
drafting committees. As one leading scholar recently wrote to me:
The law of voluntary obligations at its best is binary.
Formation rules are clear. Liability is strict. Duties, terms,
and conditions are explicit. Unlike the continuum of tort
law, contracts in general and commercial specialties in partic(court or jury) to determine
ular do not need a third party
37
their existence and scope.
I reject that view for several reasons. First, efforts to write statutes that purport to limit the ability to obtain judicial relief from aberrant behavior are doomed to fail because aggrieved parties will do so
anyway if the stakes are high enough. Second, the inherent power of
the courts is such that ways will be found to afford relief and require
fair dealing if warranted by the circumstances, including "disembowelling ' '3 8 a statute that tries to preclude such relief. Third, and perhaps
most importantly, rules that encourage rather than discourage (and
sometimes spawn) arrogant or capricious behavior by banks, secured
parties, or securities intermediaries are counterproductive and costly.
In the long run such rules lead to conflict and disruption of business
operations. None of this is new-it is all well established by history. 9
37. Letter from John F. Dolan to Donald J. Rapson (Jan. 28, 1994) (on file with the
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). Although Professor Dolan has contributed to the
revision process, generally there has been a lack of input from the academic world-a very
troubling aspect of the revision process. All too often those who teach one of the topics
under revision sit silently, instead of participating and possibly improving the focus on
public interest concerns. Only after enactment do they end their silence-frequently in an
article that is critical.
38. Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of NegotiableInstruments, 13 CEIGrroN
L. REv. 441, 458-61 (1979) (discussing judicial eviscerations of holder in due course rule).
39. There are many examples but one is particularly illustrative. In the infamous case
of K.M.C., Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985), the issue was whether the
bank-lender was under an obligation of "good faith" to provide the borrower with sufficient notice, before cutting off a line of credit and demanding repayment, to allow a reasonable opportunity to seek alternative financing. The bank contended that the broad
discretionary authority and "demand" language in the loan agreement made notice unnecessary, arguing that it could only be held liable if it acted in "bad faith" which it defined as
"dishonesty" based on the narrow subjective definition of "good faith" under UCC § 1201(19). The Sixth Circuit rejected that contention and affirmed a $7,500,000 damage
award against the bank. Id. at 766.
The decision in K.MC.sparked a plethora of lender liability litigation that continues
today. The general result is the imposition of liability where the institution acts in an aberrant or capricious manner. Conversely, where the institution comports with the broader
standard of "good faith" that requires compliance with "reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing," the institution generally prevails, and, most importantly, this usually leads
to the prevention or early and less costly resolution of litigation.
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Consumer advocates are equally aggressive in advancing their
countervailing view that prevention of harsh and abusive practices
warrants statutory rules that result in large damage awards and penalties without regard to the added transaction costs and whether or not
there has been any-harm or prejudice.' Under that approach, efficiency, including fairness, is almost irrelevant. The public interest is
no better served by a policy of retribution than it is by one that fails to
discourage misbehavior. Accordingly, even though it is essential that
consumer representatives be involved in the drafting process, such
representation and participation does not necessarily mean that the
final product will be efficient, fair, and serve the public interest.
D.

The Role of the UCC Drafting Committees

Drafting committees must be able to listen to, but then disassociate themselves from, the urgings of the interest groups. The question,
however, is whether the "environment" of the drafting committee
process inhibits drafting fair and efficient statutory rules that advance
the public interest. In theory, the reporters and the drafting committee should be able to listen, objectively evaluate, step away from, and
then rise above the interest groups. Without, however, in any way,
questioning the integrity of the drafting committees, I fear that the
process makes that very difficult to do. To the extent it is not done by
the drafting committees, Professor Patchel would be correct in charging that "the current uniform laws process, rather than providing a
means for drafting laws that represent neutral, best solutions to commercial law issues, tends instead to produce only solutions that are the
most amenable to the business special interests that largely dominate
it.,, 41

NCCUSL's procedures require that drafting committee meetings
be open and participatory to all. As a consequence, representatives
from interest groups are encouraged to and indeed unhesitatingly do
make known their views and positions. From time to time, the
chairperson of the drafting committee even asks for nonbinding votes
of the entire assemblage in order to see if there is a reaction to or a
consensus on a particular issue. That vote obviously reflects the
40. Consider the costs and complexities imposed by the Truth in Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (1988) resulting from the combination of disclosure requirements and
the provisions for civil liability-including double finance charge penalties and class actions. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1988). It is difficult for me to believe that these statutes and
the implementing regulations really afford consumers "equivalent value" in terms of either
meaningful information or lower transaction costs.
41. Patchel, supra note 22, at 162.
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number of attendees from the respective interest groups-usually the
banking groups have the highest number of attendees.
Recognizing that reality, the chairperson will then ask the drafting committee to vote-alone but publicly-a vote that often determines how the draft will come out on a particula question. Although
the individual members of the drafting committee are supposed to
speak freely on the various issues and to vote their own consciences
independently of their personal affiliations, the fact remains that their
statements and votes are publicly made in the glare of the interest
groups. To some, that may be somewhat daunting and intimidating.
Drafting committee members whose practice, employment, or academic consulting is for or on behalf of an interest group may be hard
pressed to take a position contrary to that group.
My own experience is indicative of the pressures. As a member
of the Articles 3, 4, and 4A Drafting Committees, I took several positions that were contrary'to the views of some of the bank attorney
observers. At one session, one attorney-perhaps jokingly-said,
"Don't forget who you work for," an obvious reference to the fact that
my employer, The CIT Group, Inc. (CIT), was a wholly owned subsidiary of a bank holding company group. As a member of a drafting
committee, I do not represent CIT; nor does CIT expect me to do
so.42 In my case that remark had no effect other than to anger mebut those kinds of pressures obviously can have an intimidating effect.
More recently, I had a similar experience involving the Article 9
Drafting Committee. There, I have been urging that in all deficiency
actions, regardless of the amount of a successful bid at a procedurally
correct foreclosure sale, there should be a credit for an amount equal
to what would have been realized from a "commercially reasonable"
sale, that is "fair value."4 3 This requirement would have its principal
impact when there is little or no competitive bidding or when the foreclosing secured party is the successful bidder and becomes the owner
of the collateral." Based on comments expressed at the drafting com42. Fortunately, CIT has a long tradition of encouraging its in-house counsel to participate actively in projects involving the improvement of commercial law. CIT has also gone
out of its way to allow its attorneys freedom, without any corporate interference, in the
formation and presentation of their views. That policy has worked admirably. Among my
predecessors at CIT are Homer Kripke and Carl Felsenfeld, whose contributions have
brought credit to themselves, the legal profession, and CIT.
43. Rapson, supra note 27, at 686-88.
44. Recently in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994) (5-4 decision),
Justice Souter made essentially the same point in observing that such bids (as "a peppercorn paid at a noncollusive and procedurally regular foreclosure sale," id. at 1767 (Souter,
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mittee meetings, it is apparent that most representatives of secured
parties do not support that proposal.45 At a trade association meeting
attended by some members of that interest group (including CIT), an
unfavorable comment was made concerning my proposal and my association with CIT. I do not know whether this was an attempt to get
the CIT representative to persuade me otherwise, but he told me
about the comment. Consistent with CIT history and practice, how-

ever, he did not try to influence my position.
E. The Drafting Committees for Articles 3 (Negotiable
Instruments), 4 (Bank Deposits and Collections), and 4A
(Funds Transfers)

Contrary to the comments of Professors Rubin46 and Patchel 47who did not attend the meetings-the Articles 3, 4, and 4A Drafting
Committees were not dominated by the banking interests. This balance can be attributed to the strength and independence of the
chairpersons, Carlyle C. Ring, Jr. and Robert Haydock, as well as the

reporters, Professors Robert Jordan and William Warren. The containment of the banking interests can also be attributed to the presence and active participation of attorneys' s from the Federal Reserve
who frequently took certain positions contrary to those of the banks
which they considered to be unreasonable or unfair. Clearly, those
Federal Reserve representatives acted in the finest traditions of the
public interest and true professionalism.49 Moreover, the fact that the
., dissenting)) do not constitute "reasonably equivalent value" for purposes of Bankruptcy
Code § 548, 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988):
When the prospect of such avoidance is absent, indeed, the economic interests of a foreclosing mortgagee often stand in stark opposition to those of the
debtor himself and of his other creditors. At a typical foreclosure sale, a mortgagee has no incentive to bid any more than the amount of the indebtedness, since
any "surplus" would be turned over to the debtor (or junior lienholder), and, in
some states, it can even be advantageousfor the creditor to bid less and seek a
deficiency judgment.
BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1775 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
45. Thus far, the majority of the drafting committee does not favor my proposal for
commercial transactions. There are, however, a number of supporters, and I would not be
surprised if some form of the proposal was adopted for consumer transactions.
46. Rubin, supra note 5, at 787-88.
47. Patchel, supra note 22, at 110.
48. Oliver I. Ireland, Associate General Counsel, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Washington, D.C.; Ernest T. Patrikis, General Counsel, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York; Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York; John R.H. Kimball, Associate General Counsel, Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston.
49. Professor Patchel makes an unfortunate error in lumping the Federal Reserve attorneys with "banks and bank interest groups." See Patchel, supra note 22, at 122.
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Federal Reserve opted to become actively involved in the uniform
laws process rather than urging federal legislation or regulatory action
is indicative of the merits of that process and certainly suggests caution in urging "federalization" of commercial law.
As one example, the Federal Reserve representatives were insistent upon a "final payment" rule for wire transfers which prevents a
bank that has paid the funds to the beneficiary from later recovering
those funds if the bank does not receive settlement from the originating or intermediate banks. This rule was contrary to the then prevalent practices and policies of banks in the CHIPS5" wire transfer
system, which resisted making such a change. As a result, section 4A405(c) implements a general principle of finality, subject to very limited exceptions, by making unenforceable any agreement purporting
to give the bank a right of recovery.
In the Articles 3 and 4 revision, the presence of the Federal Reserve facilitated adoption of the view that banks have a duty to exercise ordinary care with respect to the opening of accounts. 51 That
presence also fostered the view that the definition of "good faith"
should be expanded to include "reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing."5 " Several members of the drafting committee also held
these views and vigorously insisted upon statutory rules that fairly balanced the interests of banks and users of the payment systems.
IV.

THE NEED FOR IMPROVING THE PROCESS

NCCUSL's procedures should be revised to permit the drafting
committees to function in a quieter and more deliberative professional
environment. Open meetings are certainly beneficial insofar as they
afford representatives of interest groups the opportunity to express
their positions. Openness, however, also limits the ability of the members of the drafting committee to independently evaluate the validity
of these positions. The "fishbowl" of external pressures and parochial
considerations emanating from the interest groups hinders the ability
of the members to engage in thoughtful and deliberative discussions,
to use and apply their own expertise to the greatest extent possible,
and to objectively and privately make decisions on the various issues.
The inability of the drafting committee to function separately and in50. The Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) is an automated communication and settlement system that is owned and operated by the New York Clearing
House processing both international and domestic funds transfers.
51. See supra text accompanying note 13.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
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dependently from the interest groups lessens its ability to produce the
best results. It makes little sense for the drafting committee to spend
two-and-a-half days together three times a year without having any
meaningful opportunity to work alone, to discuss the issues with one
another, and to concentrate in-depth on the responsibilities at hand.
In essence, private drafting committee meetings are analogous to
the practice of legislative committees going into "executive session."
Although arguably contrary to the principle of openness and NCCUSL's focus on "building a consensus," the need for a more deliberative process is essential and critical. 53 There is, of course, a
legitimate concern about decisions made in private, but one good way
of alleviating these concerns is to follow Professor Patchel's suggestion that "the drafters' detailed explanation of the major policy
choices that have been made-and the alternative choices that have
been rejected-during the drafting process, [be] set forth in plain language and human terms." 54

A. The Revision of Article 5 (Letters of Credit)
I have a particular concern that subjecting drafting committee
members to the glare of open meetings while arriving at their decisions may have had some negative effects upon the proposed final
draft of Revised Article 5. The concern is not at all about the integrity
or ability of the drafting committee members; it is about aspects of the
process that may have impeded independent and objective decision
making in the face of interest group pressures.
Of course, the issuance of letters of credit is primarily a banking
function. Accordingly, it is fully understandable and appropriate that
bankers, bank attorneys, and bank interest groups have been very actively involved with the Article 5 Drafting Committee. Moreover, because letters of credit are used in an infinite variety of commercial
transactions, it is hard to identify a particular interest group or groups
that can be said to generally represent commercial "users." The
Treasury Management Association, whose members include treasury
executives of a number of major corporations, has been one of the few
participants in the drafting process acting on behalf of business users
of letters of credit. Consumer groups, as might be expected, have not
been involved. The net result is that banking interests have had a major presence at drafting committee meetings and in the drafting pro53. I have expressed this concern, which is not mine alone, to NCCUSL and the
chairperson and reporters of the Article 9 Drafting Committee.
54. Patchel, supra note 22, at 158.
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cess. For example, eleven of the nineteen listed advisers to the
drafting committee appear to be associated with or represent banks or
bank interest groups. I have no direct knowledge, however, of the
actual discussions at the drafting committee meetings. I am not a
member and only attended one meeting for a few hours on January
14, 1994, in order to urge some of the points being made in this article.
One of the most active of the bank groups is the U.S. Council on
International Banking, Inc. (USCIB), an industry association composed of domestic and international banks. USCIB has consistently
expressed concern that U.S. banks will be placed at a competitive disadvantage with foreign banks by being subjected to a revised Article 5
that would "isolate the U.S. from the international community, and
will invite controversy, confusion and litigation."55 USCIB has acted
in a completely professional manner in vigorously asserting its
position.
1. Proposed section 5-116(c) and preemption by the UCP
In June 1993, by which time the Article 5 Drafting Committee
had issued its seventh draft (March 31, 1993), USCIB made clear that
it could not support the revision as it was because of the purported
"Diminished Status of UCP. 5' 6 "UCP" is the Uniform Customs and
Practice for Documentary Credits, which is a set of rules periodically
issued by the International Chamber of Commerce.57 USCIB was dissatisfied because in the draft presented section 5-103(c) 58 treated "the
UCP as mere incorporated contract language that cannot displace any
UCC obligation of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, or care."5 9
USCIB stated that:
55. Letter from USCIB to Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Chairperson of the Article 5 Drafting
Committee (June 29,1993), attaching USCIB Study of FundamentalProblemswith the Seventh Draft (March31, 1993) Revision of UCCArticle 5 [hereinafter USCIB Study] (on file
with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). The USCIB Study was publicly distributed
in New York City at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the Committee on Uniform Commercial
Code, American Bar Association Section on Business Law.
56. USCIB Study, supra note 55, at 2.
57. The latest revision is known as UCP No. 500, effective January 1, 1994.
58. That provision read as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in Sections 1-102(3), 5-108(a), 5-110(b), 5-111(f),
and 5-114(a), the parties may vary their rights and obligations under this [Article]
(i) by expressly incorporating rules of practice, such as the Uniform Customs and
Practices of the International Chamber of Commerce, (ii) by a term in a letter of
credit, confirmation, or advice, or (iii) otherwise by agreement.
U.C.C. § 5-103 (Discussion Draft, Mar. 31, 1993).
59. USCIB Study, supra note 55, at 2.
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U.S. banks are becoming increasingly concerned about
the effect of current § 5-109(2) and § 1-102(3) on the typical
limitations of liability to gross negligence and bad faith and
other such boiler plate provisions. Revised UCC Article 5
should eliminate these concerns, not extend them. Revised
UCC Article 5 should unequivocally favor freedom of contract and should limit application of § 1-102(3), so that the
only mandatory provisions in Revised UCC Article 5 would
be those establishing its scope (i.e., what type of undertakings will and will not qualify as UCC Article 5 letters of
credit), and those establishing the scope of the obligation of
good faith (which should be narrowly defined in light of the
overall policy of encouraging prompt payment of facially
conforming documents). The seventh (and preceding drafts)
have not fulfilled the two goals of the UCC Article 5 revision
announced in draft § 5-101-setting a substantive framework and preserving procedure flexibility.6'
USCIB's lack of support for that draft was taken very seriously
by the drafting committee. The proposed final draft issued on May 25,
1994,61 contains the'following changes, inter alia, from the March 31,
1993, Draft:
§ 5-116. CHOICE OF LAW.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the liability of an issuer, nominated person, or adviser is governed by any rules of custom or practice, such as the
Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, to which the letter of credit, confirmation, or other
undertaking is expressly made subject. If (i) this article
would govern the liability of an issuer, nominated person, or adviser under subsection (a) or (b), (ii) the relevant undertaking incorporates rules of custom or
practice, and (iii) there is conflict between this article
60. Id. at 4 (footnote omitted).
61. This proposed final draft came before the annual membership meeting of NCCUSL in August 1994 for final approval. At that time, it was essentially approved without
substantive change. See infra text accompanying note 82. The only major change was the
addition of a new § 5-110 providing for warranties by the beneficiary on presentment.
Present § 5-111 makes provision for a similar warranty and I support the reinstatement of
this previously deleted provision. The addition of this new section resulted in the renumbering of the subsequent sections. Accordingly, the section citations to the provisions of
the Revised Article 5 in the May 25,1994, Draft are to those sections as renumbered in the
final draft approved by NCCUSL in August 1994, namely §§ 5-111(a) and 5-116(c), which
were formerly §§ 5-110(a) and 5-115(c), respectively.
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and those rules as applied to that undertaking, those
rules govern except to the extent of any conflict with the
nonvariable provisions specified in Section 5-103(c).
,and
§ 5-102. DEFINITIONS.
(a) In this article:
(7) "Good faith" means honesty in fact in the conduct
or transaction' concerned.
I assume that section 5-116(c) is an accommodation by the drafting committee to meet the USCIB concerns, and has its support. The
retention in section 5-102(a)(7) of the subjective definition of "good
faith" presently in section 1-201(19) is clearly in accord with the
wishes of most bank interest groups.62 But are these provisions in the
public interest? I doubt it.
Under proposed section 5-116(c), if a letter of credit is "expressly
made subject" to the UCP, the rules of Article 5 governing the liability of an issuer of the letter of credit are, in effect, preempted by the
UCP rules. There is an exception for certain nonvariable UCC provisions specified in proposed section 5-103, but one would be hard
pressed to find any significant exceptions in those provisions. Section
1-102(3) is one of the exceptions and provides that "the obligations of
good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by the Act
may not be disclaimed by agreement." 63 However, there do not appear to be any special obligations of this kind imposed upon issuers in
Revised Article 5. Indeed, there is no obligation of "reasonable care";
instead, proposed section 5-108(e) provides that issuers "shall observe
standard practice of financial institutions that regularly issue letters of
credit."' It is true that section 1-203 superimposes an obligation of
"good faith" in the performance or enforcement of every contract or
duty under Article 5. As defined, however, in proposed section 5102(a)(7), this obligation is limited to subjective "honesty in fact" and
62. Prior to the USCIB Study, draft § 5-102(b) of the March 31, 1993, Draft incorporated § 3-103(a)(4) which provides that" 'Good faith'.means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." The Subcommittee on Letters
of Credit of the Banking Law Committee of the New York State Bar Association opposed
the inclusion of "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing" on the ground that it is
"vague and uncertain ... and does not provide a workable standard in the LOC context."
Letter from Michael Evan Avidon, Chairperson of the Subcommittee on Letters of Credit,
to Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Chairperson of the Drafting Committee and Professor James J.
White, Reporter (Aug. 13, 1993) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
63. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1990).
64. U.C.C. § 5-108(e) (Revised Article 5 as approved by NCCUSL Aug. 1994) (on file
with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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does not include "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing."
Banks generally do not act "dishonestly," but they have been known
to act arbitrarily and capriciously.
Proposed section 5-116(c) can be traced to nonuniform section 5102(4) enacted in New York in 1962 on the recommendation of the
New York Clearing House Association, which was thereafter also enacted in Alabama, Arizona, and Missouri. Under that provision, Article 5 is wholly inapplicable if by the terms of the letter of credit or by
agreement, the letter of credit is made subject to the UCP. Most letters of credit issued in New York and throughout the United States
say that they are subject to the UCP.
It is significant to note that nonuniform section 5-102(4) was expressly rejected in 1964 by NCCUSL, ALI, and PEB as "both unacceptable and unsound."'65 Among other things, the sponsoring
organizations questioned "the general wisdom of any state legislature's enacting comprehensive and serious legislation, all of which can
be rendered completely nugatory by the election of individual persons." 66 The pending proposal seems equally objectionable. It is, in
essence, a state statute ceding to an international group-here, the
International Chamber of Commerce-the right and ability to make
rules governing issuer liability over which state law would have no
control. This is true even if the transaction is entirely within the
United States or just one state. Although it is certainly appropriate,
and consistent with present law, for Article 5 to incorporate UCP
rules of custom and practice as aids in determining whether there is
liability under Article 5, proposed section 5-116(c) appears to go further and allow the UCP to adopt rules of custom and practice that
would "govern the liability of an issuer" in preemption of Article 5.
The proponents of proposed section 5-116(c) may contend that
there is no present conflict between proposed Revised Article 5 and
the UCP. That, however, overlooks the fact that proposed section 5116(c) is open-ended so -thatquestions of issuer liability would be subject to future changes in the UCP. For example, if the UCP were
amended to mandate arbitration of claims against issuers, that would
be binding. A UCP amendment requiring a beneficiary to mitigate
damages before recovering from an issuer for wrongful dishonor
would be contrary to proposed section 5-111(a), but might be binding.
More drastically, the UCP might be amended at a future time to pro65. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REPORT No.

2 at 95400 (Oct. 31, 1964).
66. Id. at 99.
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hibit an applicant from seeking injunctive relief against payment of a
letter of credit, even if based on fraud or forgery.67 Such a rule might
also be binding.
If it is true that there are no inconsistencies between proposed
Article 5 and the UCP on matters of issuer liability, and if one can
make the assumption that there will not be any amendments to the
UCP limiting fights against issuers, why is section 5-116(c) being proposed? USCIB's reasons are clear-it is quite candid in stating that it
is more comfortable with and prefers to be governed by the UCP.
The USCIB stated that:
While the UCP is partly standard contract language, it is also
recognized by the market and the courts throughout the
world as the de facto law which defines and regulates the
interlocking relationships among applicant, issuer, adviser,
confirmer, nominated bank, beneficiary, transferring bank,
and transferee beneficiary. The UCP is so recognized because it reflects the understandings and practices of internationally active bank L/C departments on a worldwide basis,
and they regularly occupy all of the roles governed by the
UCP, including the roles of applicant and beneficiary.,
In all of this discussion, however, to what extent have the interests of
applicants and beneficiaries which are not banks been sufficiently protected? What are the expectations of nonbank users of letters of
credit with respect to their rights and remedies against an issuer, particularly in transactions that are solely domestic? If there is to be an
Article 5 in the UCC covering letters of credit, should not the rights
and remedies of such users be governed by that state law? Can there
be any assurance that these users will be dealt with fairly under the
UCP and that there will be proper safeguards against aberrant, capricious, or arbitrary behavior?
Supporters of proposed section 5-116(c) may also contend that
the provision does nothing more than permit an "agreement" between
the issuer, applicant, and beneficiary. This "agreement" allows the
UCP to govern in the circumstance where the letter of credit is "expressly made subject" to the UCP and the beneficiary then fails to
reject the letter of credit. Such an "agreement," however, is neither
express nor affirmative; it arises out of silence. Is it commercially rea67. Cf. proposed § 5-109(b) (providing for court of competent jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief to applicant who "claims that a required document is forged or materially
fraudulent or that honor of the presentation would facilitate a material fraud").
68. USCIB Study, supra note 55, at 2.
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sonable and realistic to say that nonbank users who obtain letters of
credit in the ordinary course of their business operations have made

such an "express" agreement? Banks uniformly insert such language
in the boilerplate of a letter of credit; there is no real opportunity to
bargain for its deletion. Letters of credit are routinely received and
accepted by businesspeople without consulting attorneys and most

businesspeople would not realize that they have given up their rights
and remedies under state law and instead subjected themselves to international rules which ordinarily do not have the status of law. This
is a troubling proposal.
2. Proposed section 5-102(a)(7) and the rejection of "reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing" as part of "good faith"
Proposed section 5-102(a)(7) represents an advertent refusal by
the drafting committee to broaden the definition of "good faith" to
include "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." In doing
so, the Article 5 Drafting Committee is the first and only UCC drafting committee to make this decision 69 and to thereby create a clear

inconsistency with Articles 2A, 3, 4, and 4A, as well as proposed Revised Article 8.70

One anomalous consequence of this decision is that in a letter of
credit transaction the'bank is held to a lesser standard of good faith
69. Although Alternative B for a revised Artible 6 uses the subjective definition of § 1201(19), the Article 6 Drafting Committee was not called upon to address the question.
See U.C.C. § 6-102(3) (1990) (incorporating the general definitions in Article 1).
Section 6-107(3)(a), however, uses a standard of "good faith and commercially reasonable" in insulating a buyer from liability to creditors where the buyer makes such an effort
to comply with Article 6, or believes that Article 6 is not applicable to a particular sale.
The "commercially reasonable" phrase was added to the draft as the result of an ALI
membership vote to amend "good faith" to include "reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing." See Annual Meeting The American Law Institute, 66 A.L.I. PRoc. 429-38
(1990). Alternative A, which opts for repeal of Article 6, has already been adopted in the
majority of the states.
70. See U.C.C. 88 2A-103, 3-103(a)(4), 4-104(c), and 4A-105(a)(6) (1990). In 1993 the
Article One Task Force of the American Bar Association Section on Business Law, cochaired by William B. Davenport of Chicago and Harry C. Sigman of Los Angeles, recommended to PEB that "good faith" in § 1-201(19) be amended to reflect the broader definition. PEB opted, however, to leave the decision to each drafting committee. Section 8102(a)(9) of the final draft of Revised Article 8, approved in 1994 by NCCUSL and AI,
provides:
"Good faith," for purposes of the obligation of good faith in the performance or
enforcement of contracts or duties within this Article (Section 1-203), means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing.
U.C.C. Revised Article 8, Investment Securities (Proposed Final Draft at 35, Apr. 5, 1994)
(on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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than it is held to in the enforcement and collection of negotiable instruments, the payment of cashier's and other bank checks, or the
execution and payment of wire transfers. Another anomalous consequence is that the applicant and beneficiary in a letter of credit transaction are held to a lesser standard of good faith than they are in the
71
underlying transaction.
It is, nevertheless, understandable that banks would be concerned
if "fair dealing" were to be a factor in determining the propriety of a
decision to honor or dishonor a presentation for payment under a letter of credit.7 2 Accordingly, taking cognizance of that concern, on
January 15, 1994, I proposed to the Article 5 Drafting Committee that
it adopt the following definition:
"Good faith" means honesty in fact and the observance
of [reasonable commercial standards of] fair dealing in the
letter of credit transaction. An issuer or confirmer acts in
good faith if it honors or dishonors a draft or demand for
payment solely upon: its determination as to whether the
draft or demand for payment is strictly in compliance with
the terms of the relevant letter of credit (§ 5-108), even
though honor or dishonor is made with knowledge of a claim
of fraud by another person.73
In making that recommendation, I stated:
71. If the underlying transaction is a sale or lease of goods by a merchant, "good faith"
means that the parties must act in accordance with "reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing in the trade." See U.C.C. §§ 2-103(1)(b), 2A-103(3). Similarly, in most states,
if the underlying transaction involves a non-UCC contractual obligation, "good faith" requires compliance with "reasonable'commercial standards of fair dealing." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CoNTRAs § 205 (1979).
72. For example, the Subcommittee on Letters of Credit of the Banking Law Committee of the New York State Bar Association expressed its concerns in the following terms:
LOC banks deal in documents, not goods, in representations, not facts. A
bank is entitled to reimbursement if it honors upon presentation of the stipulated
documents, whether or not a judge would think it "fair" for the bank to honor
even though the applicant swears it was short-shipped and begs the bank to count
the widgets for itself. Notions of "fair dealing" will probably do violence to the
independence principle and involve banks in disputes relating to the underlying
transaction, rather than the presentation of conforming documents under a LOC.
Letter from Michael Evan Avidon, supra note 62, at 6. For the similar position of USCIB
see James G. Barnes, Defining Good FaithLetter of CreditPractices,28 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
101 (1994).
73. Letter from Donald J. Rapson to Carlyle C. Ring, Jr. (Jan. 15, 1994) (on file with
the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). Proposed § 5-108(a) requires an issuer to honor
a presentation that "appears on its face strictly to comply with the terms and conditions of
the letter of credit." U.C.C. § 5-108(a) (Revised Article 5 as approved by NCCUSL Aug.
1994) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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The rationale for this approach is to deter commercially
inappropriate behavior by applicants and beneficiaries alike
by requiring them to adhere to the same standard of "fair
dealing" that is usually applicable to their underlying transaction by reason of either Article 2 or 2A or the general law
of contracts, while at the same time insulating banks that adhere to the strict compliance standard from bad faith claims.
I believe that this proposal is an appropriate compromise of
the various views expressed yesterday and urge its adoption
by the Drafting Committee. If, however, the Drafting Committee rejects this suggestion and continues to recommend
the "honesty in fact" standard alone, I would hope that the
Drafting Committee would explain its position-and that the
explanation would be something more than a knee-jerk aversion to "fair dealing" or a response that requiring applicants
and beneficiaries to adhere to the standard of commercial
"fair dealing" is somehow inimical to the unique world of
letters of credit, even though issuing and confirming banks
that adhere to the strict compliance standard would be
protected.7 4
The drafting committee, however, rejected that proposal at its meeting
of March 12, 1994. As of this writing, I know of no rationale or justification for this rejection other than the general dislike by the bank
interest groups of a requirement for compliance with "reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing." 75
3. Proposed section 5-111(a) and the exculpation from
consequential damage liability for wrongful dishonor
In its present form76 and under proposed section 5-111(a), Article

5 is also inconsistent with Articles 3 and 4A 77 with respect to the liability of an obligated bank for consequential damages arising out of a
74. Letter from Donald J.Rapson, supra note 73, at 1-2.
75. Memorandum from Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Chair of the Drafting Committee, accompanying the Proposed Final Draft (May 25, 1994) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review) states:
"Good Faith" definition. This draft uses the Article 1 definition of "honesty in
fact" (Subjective Standard). Issuers (particularly Banks) believe that adding "fair
dealing" will undermine certainty of payment by inviting courts to look into the
underlying transaction, thereby seriously eroding the "independence" principle
and the "strict compliance" standard essential to the commercial effectiveness of
Letters of Credit. The Drafting Committee supports this view.

76. U.C.C. § 5-115(1) (1990).
77. Id. §§ 3-411(b), 4A-404(a).
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wrongful dishonor or refusal to pay. Present section 5-115(1) provides
that upon wrongful dishonor by an issuer, the person entitled to payment "may recover from the issuer the face amount of the draft or
demand together with incidental damages." No mention is made of
consequential damages. This can be attributed to the fact that present
Article 5 focuses only on the traditional commercial letter of credit, as
distinguished from stand-by letters of credit, and treats the aggrieved
person as a "seller." Thus, the measure of damages is based on Article 2.78 The fact that a creditor might suffer consequential damages as
a result of being deprived of the funds does not appear to have been
considered. Proposed section 5-111(a) makes explicit what is implicit
in present section 5-115(1) and expressly prevents either a beneficiary
or an applicant from recovering "consequential damages."
Recent UCC revisions, however, have expressly dealt with this
point in the analogous cases of wrongful dishonor or refusal to pay (1)
bank checks on which a bank is primarily liable, that is cashier's,
teller's, or certified checks and (2) wire transfers that have been accepted by the beneficiary's bank. Sections 3-411(b) and 4A-404(a),
respectively, provide for recovery of consequential damages if the
bank's refusal to pay is wrongful and the obligated bank is given notice of the particular circumstances giving rise to consequential damages. The purpose is to discourage banks from such refusals to pay
and to implement the principle of certainty of payment. 79 The notice
requirement assures that the bank is informed of the general type or
nature, and magnitude of the consequential damages that will be suffered as a result of the refusal to pay before it can be held liable. 80
The Treasury Management Association expressly requested the
drafting committee to include a provision in Article 5 similar to
sections 3-411(b) and 4A-404(a). At the meeting of March 12, 1994,
however, the drafting committee rejected that proposal.
Letters of credit are extremely important in commercial transactions because they serve either as (i) payment mechanisms or (ii) assurances of the payment or performance of obligations. In either
circumstance, the hallmark of the letter of credit is the certainty of
payment by the issuer-bank. Discouraging wrongful dishonor or repu78. See id. §§ 2-708(1), 2-710. Generally, consequential damages are not specifically
recoverable because the contract price usually includes the seller's profit. But cf. § 2708(2) (providing an alternative measure including profit if "subsection (1) is inadequate to
put the seller in as good a position as performance would have done").
79. d.§§ 3-411 cmt. 1, 4A-404 cmt. 3.
80. See id.
§ 4A-404 cmt. 2.
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diation of the obligation to pay is, at the very least, equally important
in the case of letters of credit as in the case of bank checks and wire
transfers. Yet, the very mechanism for discouraging wrongful dishonor or repudiation-potential liability for consequential damageshas been explicitly and intentionally rejected in proposed section 5111(a). There is no discernable reason or rationale for creating such
an obvious inconsistency between the treatment of bank checks and
wire transfers on the one hand, and letters of credit on the other-and
none has been given. The provision for notice to the bank adequately
protects the bank against unfair surprise and affords it an opportunity
to avoid consequential damage liability by making payment.
4. The role of the interest groups
All three issues, (i) preemption of Article 5 by the UCP under
section 5-116(c), (ii) broadening the definition of "good faith" in section 5-102(a)(7), and (iii) consequential damages liability for wrongful
dishonor under section 5-111(a), have thus far found little or no support in the drafting committee. It is uncertain whether or to what
extent the first issue has been examined. The Treasury Management
Association was the only interest group supporting proposals that addressed the second and third issues. This lack of support is disturbing.
The chairperson of the Article 5 Drafting Committee, Carlyle C.
Ring, Jr., who also chaired the Articles 3, 4 and 4A Drafting Committees, is an excellent lawyer and a very fair-minded individual. He has
made certain that all points of view, including mine, were thoroughly
aired. Professor James J. White, the eminent UCC authority, is the
reporter. The members of the Article 5 Drafting Committee have
outstanding expertise; indeed, half of them are also serving on the Article 9 Drafting Committee. This makes it difficult for me to question
the decisions by the drafting committee, but I am compelled to do so.
This should not be construed in any way as a criticism of the drafting
committee members or their integrity. Rather, these questions are directed to the revision process which, because of its susceptibility to
interest group pressures and the emphasis on legislative success, may
impede the ability of the drafting committee to make independent and
objective judgments on substantive and policy issues.
My concern is that the drafting committee may not have had the
opportunity to step away from the pressures of the bank interest
groups and objectively discuss and evaluate the three proposals in a
private deliberative manner. Were the actions of the drafting committee based on its independent and objective belief that rejection of the
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proposals was really in the public interest? Or was the drafting committee driven by the realization that rejection of the proposals, no
matter how meritorious, was necessary for the support of the bank
interest groups in the legislative process? Bearing in mind that the
drafting process was in the final stages after four years and that NCCUSL emphasizes legislative enactment as the criterion for success,
did the drafting committee have the flexibility to adopt the proposals
even if it meant losing the support of the bank interest groups? It may
well be that the drafting committee truly believed that its decisions
were in the public interest and would have arrived at those decisions
irrespective of interest group pressures. The point of these questions
is to focus upon the revision process and whether it was conducive to
81
independent and objective decision making.
5.

Challenging the drafting committee's decisions

I submitted memoranda raising these three issues to the annual
membership meeting of NCCUSL in August 1994 and intend to raise
these issues before the ALI meeting in May 1995. Although the normal tendency of these organizations is to approve drafts submitted to
them at their annual meetings, they do not merely "rubber-stamp"
those drafts and I was hopeful that the NCCUSL meeting would result
in modifications to the Article 5 Draft with respect to these three issues. Regrettably, however, NCCUSL approved the drafting committee's resolution of the three issues without change.'n
Important changes to prior UCC drafts of other articles have
emerged from these meetings. Most dramatic, perhaps, was the decision of the NCCUSL membership at its 1988 meeting to reject a re81. Mr. Ring responds in this Symposium to these questions and states that "the drafting committee, its advisers, and other participants honestly believe that the policy choices
that Donald Rapson challenges are in the public interest" and that "the question is fundamentally whether an 'individualized' definition of 'public interest' or a 'collective wisdom'
of what is in the public interest is to prevail." Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., The UCC ProcessConsensus and Balance, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv.289, 307 (1994). Mr. Ring, however, does

not discuss the fact that two of those policy choices (that is, "good faith" and the relationship of UCP) are inconsistent with the drafting committee's earlier choices reflected in the
March 31, 1993, Draft; that even though that draft excluded recovery of consequential
damages, that choice was inconsistent with the choices recently made by NCCUSL and
ALI in their recent approvals of Articles 3 and 4A; that USCIB objected generally to the
March 31, 1993, Draft and specifically to the first two choices; and that the ensuing drafts
then did a complete turnabout on those two issues so as to seemingly adopt the USCIB
position.
82. Letter from Carlyle C. Ring, Jr. to Donald J. Rapson (Aug. 8, 1994) (on file with
the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) (including "a copy of Revised Article 5 as approved by NCCUSL on a vote by states 51-0").
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vised Article 6 submitted by the drafting committee and instead to
recommend repeal of the bulk sales law. Repeal has, in fact, rapidly
occurred in more than half of the states-much to the surprise of
many on the drafting committee.83
Another important change took place at the 1990 meeting, when
the NCCUSL membership rejected a recommendation by the Articles
3 and 4 Drafting Committee, which was favored by the banks. The
drafting committee had recommended that losses, created when employees (who have "responsibility" with respect to checks) forge their
employers' signatures as drawers of checks, be allocated to the employer rather than the bank. As a consequence of the rejection of that
recommendation, section 3-405, which reflects the allocation principle, is only applicable to indorsements, and banks continue to have
the burden of proving that the employer was negligent under section
3-406 in order to shift loss with respect to forged drawers' signatures.
Although NCCUSL's approval of proposed sections 5-116(c), 5102(a)(7), and 5-111(a) is disappointing, I have no regrets about having raised the issues and am glad that they were considered and discussed by NCCUSL. I plan on pursuing these issues with the ALl.
Important changes have resulted from prior ALI meetings. At its
1990 meeting, the suretyship rules of section 3-605 were changed in
the interest of promoting settlements and -workouts. As a consequence, section 3-605(c) provides that a secondary obligor is not discharged by an agreement, made without its consent, between the
primary obligor and the creditor for an extension of the time to pay
unless the secondary obligor "proves that the extension caused loss."
At the recent May 1994 meeting, which approved Revised Article 8
and accompanying amendments to Article 9, it was agreed that there
would be new and expanded comments clarifying the relationship between the priority rules in new section 9-115 governing conflicting security interests in investment property and the revised adverse claim
and "protected purchaser" rules. These comments will make clear
what the final draft had left in doubt; section 9-115 does not preclude
resort to non-UCC law through section 1-103 in order to provide relief
83. That experience exemplifies the need for separating the drafting process from the
legislative process. Even with the majority of the Article 6 Drafting Committee favoring
repeal, the drafting committee never made that recommendation until pressed by the NCCUSL membership. Some members believed that the unlikelihood of legislative success,
combined with an institutional lack of flexibility, precluded the drafting committee from
making that recommendation. See Steven L. Harris, Article 6: The Processand the Product-An Introduction, 41 ALA. L. REv. 549, 560-61, 567 (1990); Peter Winship, Lawmaking and Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 ALA. L. REv. 673, 683 n.34 (1990).
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from misbehavior that gives rise to an adverse claim by a party who is
subordinate under the priority rules. With that recent history in mind,
I hope to persuade the ALI to take a different position than NCCUSL
on these three issues raised by the Article 5 Final Draft.
As of the writing of this article, I do not know whether my misgivings about Revised Article 5 will cause me to withhold support for
its approval and enactment if the positions on the three issues are not
changed.84 To gain support the drafting committee will have to make
the case that Revised Article 5 on balance is an improvement over
existing law. Given the heavy investment by NCCUSL of time, effort,
and expense in arriving at a final draft, rejection by the sponsoring
organizations, or approval but non-adoption in the states, would certainly be unfortunate. On the other hand, the sponsoring organizations cannotafford to allow the integity of the process to be impaired
by a perception that it was influenced by the pressures of an interest
group. Professor Patchel's concluding observation that NCCUSL
"runs the risk not only of tarnishing its reputation as a neutral body of
experts, but also of becoming a marginal player in the future development of the commercial law"85 cannot be ignored.
Indeed, if there were principled modifications with respect to the
three issues, there could be a long-range therapeutic and beneficial
effect. In the words of Homer Kripke, who has contributed so much
to the greatness of the UCC, "extensive technical legislation like the
U.C.C. has to be drafted by a select group [not dominated by any
interest groups] before it is worked over by the legislature with particular focus [at that later time] on the political and other public aspects
of the situation."86 If this concept becomes a reality, considerable
progress in improving the uniform laws process will have been made.
For this to happen, NCCUSL must change its mind-set that success is measured by the extent and rapidity of legislative enactment by
the states.87 I agree with Professor Patchel's suggestion that the sponsoring organizations must "place the importance of enactment in per84. Are my comments about Revised Article 5 different than Professor Rubin's criticisms of the revision of Articles 3 and 4 which I have said were not "wholly objective and
fair"? See supra text accompanying note 12. I believe that they are different. Here, I have
advanced specific proposals to the drafting committee. These proposals have been rejected
without my thus far receiving a rationale for the rejection based on the substantive merits
of the proposals. Cf.Ring, supra note 81.
85. Patchel, supra note 22, at 164.
86. Homer Kripke, A Reflective Pause'Between UCC Past and UCC Future, 43 0HIo

ST. LJ.603, 604 (1982) (emphasis added).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
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spective," and that NCCUSL should "in an appropriate situation,
draft the law that it considers to represent the better position, even
though adopting that position may cause a politically influential group
to oppose the law in the state legislatures."' Indeed, I believe that
implementation of that suggestion is a key to the present and future
success of the UCC and the roles of NCCUSL and ALl. If proposals
for revisions to the UCC were viewed as an informed judgment on the
merits rather than a filtered consensus of conflicting interest group
views, the likelihood of enactment may well be enhanced. Fortunately, no matter what happens to Article 5, the opportunity for
achieving that success is directly at hand with the ongoing revision of
Article 9.89

B.- The Revision of Article 9 (Secured Transactions)
UCC revisions have been governed by NCCUSL's uniform laws
procedures only since 1986. 90 The procedures for the UCC drafting
committees have, in fact, been evolving and changing in recent years.
NCCUSL has been sensitive and responsive to suggestions and criticisms made by persons in and outside of the revision process. Some
examples are NCCUSL's recognition of the need for significant modifications of the 1987 version of Article 2A;91 and the acceptance of
extensive clarificatory revisions to the comments explaining the new
suretyship rules of new Article 3 and coordinating those rules with
ALI's new Restatement of Suretyship.92 Other examples are the inclusion of consumer representatives to the drafting committees for Articles 2 and 9;93 establishing PEB Study Committees to review and
document the need for revisions to a UCC article prior to establishing
a drafting committee; 94 and cooperation with the Members Consulta88. Patchel, supra note 22, at 159.
89. At the same time, the Article 2 (Sales) Drafting Committee is working on the very
formidable task of revising, and probably expanding, Article 2. I am only peripherally
involved with the work of that drafting committee. Accordingly, the following discussion is
confined to the Article 9 Drafting Committee only because I am a member and thus actively involved in its work. I have no reason to believe, however, that anything I say with
respect to the procedures, work, and opportunity for success of the Article 9 Drafting
Committee is not equally applicable to the Article 2 Drafting Committee.
90. See supra text accompanying note 30.
91. See U.C.C. Article 2A (Leases) (1987) (amended 1990).
92. PEB Commentary No. 11, [PEB Commentaries] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
(Suretyship Issues Under §§ 3-116, 3-305, 3-415, 3-419 and 3-605) (Feb. 10, 1994).
93. See supra text accompanying note 17.
94. The PEB, with the support of NCCUSL and ALI, established study committees to
study and recommend whether Articles 2 and 9 and related provisions are in need of revision and, if so, to recommend the nature and substance of the revisions. The Article 9
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tive Groups established by ALI to critique draft revisions during the
drafting process.95 Consequently, I would expect NCCUSL to be willing to adapt some of its procedures for the Article 9 Drafting Committee in accordance with suggestions made below and those by Professor
Patchel.96
It is important to recognize that there is no pressing need to revise Article 9.97 It works very well and is generally acknowledged to
be a brilliant statutory creation which has brought certainty and efficiency to secured transactions law and practice, replacing prior complexity and confusion. Accordingly, there is no reason for NCCUSL
or anyone else to be obsessed with bringing about legislative amendments. Nor does any particular interest group appear to have concerns of such great magnitude as to mandate the need for immediate
legislation.
That, however, is not to suggest that a revision of Article 9 is
inappropriate. There is clearly room for improvement. First, existing
statutory ambiguities and deficiencies need clarification. Second, Article 9 needs to better deal with special kinds of financing such as agricultural finance. Third, greater guidance is needed with respect to
procedures, particularly in Part 5 dealing with enforcement on default.
Fourth, Article 9 should rectify perceived abuses, for example, deficiency actions against consumers. Fifth, a modernization of the statute should take account of new forms of complex commercial
financing arrangements such as asset securitization (also known as
structured finance). Sixth, the UCC filing system must be improved
so as to accommodate vastly increased volume and to utilize new and
Study Committee made its recommendations after a two-year study. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY GROUP, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 REPORT (Dec. 1, 1992) [hereinafter STUDY GROUP REPORT].
The STUDY GROUP REPORT forms the basis for most of the proposals being considered by
the Article 9 Drafting Committee. Additional issues are also being considered. For example, my proposal for a "fair value" credit in deficiency actions was only developed near the
end of the study and was too late to be considered in the STUDY GROUP REPORT. See
supra text accompanying note 43.
95. ALI has established Members Consultative Groups for each of the UCC articles
under revision. These groups meet periodically with the respective reporters to review
particular issues. Other interested persons are invited to attend and participate.
96. See Patchel, supra note 22, at 155-62.
97. Compare the prompt revision of Article 8, where the evolution of the indirect holding system for securities and the possibility of federal preemption due to concerns expressed by the Securities and Exchange Commission made the revision a compelling
necessity. See A.L.I. & NCCUSL, U.C.C. Revised Article 8, Investment Securities, Proposed Fnal Draft at xi-xii, 1-32 (Apr. 5, 1994) (foreword by Geoffrey C. Hazard, Director
A.L.I.).
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developing technology. As cogently stated by the Article 9 Study
Committee,
the Committee believes that Article 9 is fundamentally and
conceptually sound; it does not contemplate that the Drafting Committee would change materially the concepts of attachment and perfection or would devise radically new
priority rules or means of enforcement. Nevertheless, the
Committee believes that the improvements that are likely to
result from revising Article 9 along the lines suggested in this
report are sufficiently great to justify the costs of reeducation, unintended consequences, and temporary
nonuniformity that would attend the revision.98
It is, therefore, imperative that the Article 9 Drafting Committee
be allowed to proceed in a careful, deliberative, and thoughtful manner to objectively consider and evaluate the various proposed revisions-and to do so free from the glare, pressures, and urgings of the
many interest groups. This imperative creates an ideal setting for
modifying the procedures of the drafting committee in accordance
with the following suggestions:
1. The first day of the two-and-a-half day meeting should be for
the drafting committee alone, at which time it would discuss and deliberate issues, proposals, and drafts presented by the reporters.
Votes would be taken, language in draft statutes and comments would
be reviewed and determinative decisions would be made. The drafting committee would also review the agenda for the next day's "open"
meeting and examine the anticipated issues.
2. The second day of each meeting would be an open meeting
conducted in accordance with NCCUSL's present procedures. The
decisions taken on the first day by the drafting committee would be
reported and the various observers and interest groups could comment on those decisions as they saw fit. In addition, the observers and
the interest groups would be asked to comment on proposals and
drafts on the agenda submitted in advance by the reporters. Reports
on particular issues by special consultants, experts or committees
would also be presented. The drafting committee would listen and ask
questions, but not vote on any issues. At the chairperson's discretion,
nonbinding votes of the observers could be taken.
3. On the last half-day, the previous day's agenda would be
completed. The floor would be opened for anyone to present new
98. STUDY GROUP

REPORT, supra note

94, at 6.
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matters. The reporters would summarize their views concerning the
results of the meeting, which would then be reduced to written synopses and publicly disseminated. Finally, the reporters would outline
their program for the interim before the next meeting and present a
suggested agenda for that meeting.
4. As the process proceeds, discussion drafts and eventually
proposed final drafts would be prepared, circulated, and reviewed by
the drafting committee, the advisers, and the observers-much like
the current procedure. The comments to these drafts, in addition to
containing the customary explanatory material, would also identify
and summarize the various issues that had arisen, their proposed resolution, and when appropriate present alternative formulations. Written comments upon the drafts and comments would be encouraged
and distributed to all interested persons with a view to stimulating
discussion and comment by the drafting committee.
5. Upon completion of a final draft with proposed comments, it
would be published and distributed as widely as possible for written
comment by interested persons for a "cooling-off" period9 9 of not less
than six months. All comments must be reviewed by all members of
the drafting committee; it is essential that those persons taking the
time and effort to write comments know that they will receive careful
attention. The drafting committee would meet alone, as necessary, to
discuss and evaluate these comments and to make appropriate revisions to the final draft.
6. Following the conclusion of the "cooling-off" period and the
preparation of a revised final draft, the final draft would then be submitted for approval to NCCUSL and ALl.
This changed process requires strong leadership from the
chairperson and the reporters-establishing specific agendas, fixing
target dates, adhering to schedules, and budgeting and rationing discussion times with a firm hand. The Article 9 Drafting Committee has
that kind of leadership. 1°° Undoubtedly, there may be some lessening
of the "openness" of the meetings; not everyone will be able to speak
as much or as often as he or she likes. Instead, participants should be
encouraged to submit their comments by letters or memoranda to the
drafting committee with the assurance that these comments will be
99. This proposal for a "cooling-off" period has been long urged by Harry Sigman. See
Harry C. Sigman, Improving the UCC Revision Process: Two Specific Proposals,28 Loy.
L.A. L. REv. 327-28 (1994).
100. William M. Burke is the chairperson of the Article 9 Drafting Committee and
Professors Steven L. Harris and Charles W. Mooney, Jr. are the reporters.
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circulated and carefully considered. Submission of written comments
and materials on particular subjects in lieu of unstructured oral discussions will much improve the quality of the deliberations. Throughout
the process, the emphasis must be on advancing the public interest by
developing rules that will be clear, concise, and efficient, 10 1 with the
prospect for legislative success not being a primary factor.
V.

CONCLUSION

Professor Rubin has performed a service by drawing attention to
the UCC revision process and demonstrating the need for consumer
representation and participation in that process. Regrettably, the bitterness of his own experience and his lack of objectivity concerning
the revision of Articles 3 and 4 may have detracted from the merits of
his focus upon process. Professor Patchel, however, has advanced
from that point and presented a thoughtful and insightful analysis of
the uniform laws procedures that currently govern the UCC revision
process. She has done so from the perspective of an "outsider" to that
process and offered important constructive suggestions' ° for improving and making the process more relevant to the future developrfient
of the commercial law. 10 3
In this article, I have attempted to objectively evaluate the analyses of Professors Rubin and Patchel from the perspective of an "insider" who has been a part of the process that they have criticizedand to objectively evaluate that process. It seems that we agree on a
number of points, particularly the need for a more deliberative and
thoughtful process that takes into account the concerns of all interest
groups, but which then focuses upon and emphasizes the public interest in producing the final product. I have made a number of suggestions to accomplish that result which can and should be immediately
implemented in the ongoing revision of Article 9. I am optimistic that
this will happen-hopefully sooner and not later.

101. This means that the rules must be fair and encourage fair dealing. See supra text
accompanying note 34.
102. Patchel, supra note 22, at 155-62.
103. Id. at 164.
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